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Abstract: What does it take to see how autistic people participate in social interactions? And 
what does it take to support and invite more participation? Western medicine and cognitive 
science tend to think of autism mainly in terms of social and communicative deficits. But research 
shows that autistic people can interact with a skill and sophistication that are hard to see when 
starting from a deficit idea. Research also shows that not only autistic people, but also their non-
autistic interaction partners can have difficulties interacting with each other. To do justice to 
these findings, we need a different approach to autistic interactions—one that helps everyone 
see, invite, and support better participation.  
 
I introduce such an approach, based on the enactive theory of participatory sense-making and 
supported by insights from indigenous epistemologies. This approach helps counteract the 
homogenising tendencies of the “global mental health” movement, which attempts to erase 
rather than recognise difference, and often precludes respectful engagements. Based in the lived 
experiences of people in their socio-cultural-material and interactive contexts, I put forward an 
engaged—even engaging—epistemology for understanding how we interact across difference. 
From this perspective, we see participatory sense-making at work across the scientific, diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and everyday interactions of autistic and non-autistic people, and how everyone can 
invite and support more of it. 
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1. Between a fishbowl and an imitation game  
What does it take to see how autistic people participate in their social interactions—among 
themselves and with non-autistics? And what does it take to invite and support more and better 
participation, if, when, and as desired and appropriate?1  
If we engage badly with someone or something we are trying to understand, we may 
misunderstand and potentially damage them. This regularly happens with autistic people, and 
with autism as a topic. Damian Milton, an autistic autism researcher, writes that approaches to 
autism “often [lead] to ill-fated attempts at normalisation and a continuing vicious cycle of 
psycho-emotional disablement” (2014, p. 799). This happens because the lived experiences of 
autistic people are often taken as deficient and as not relevant or interesting in their own right 
(Yergeau 2018, Hens 2019, Jaswal and Akhtar 2019).  
It happens for instance when autistic people are taught the ‘rules of social interaction,’ as part 
of one or another ‘remedial program’. For example, autistic children are ‘taught’ to make eye-
contact by conditioning them. But it is well known that making eye-contact can be painful for 
autistic people (Schaber 2014). 2  Teaching them to make eye-contact ignores—even goes 
against—the needs and sensitivities of many autistic people. This example in the realm of practice 
has its counterpart in psychological theories about autism, such as the Theory of Mind (ToM) 
theory, which suggests autistic people have difficulty reading other people’s minds (Baron-Cohen 
et al. 2013). Such theories are objectivist and individualistic, and start from a detached view of 
the human psyche and social world. Because of this, these theories preclude us from seeing 
autistic people’s engagement. Teaching people (autistic or not) the ‘rules’ of social interaction 
does not tend to lead to improved social fluency (Ozonoff and Miller 1995;  Koenig et al. 2009).  
This is because our social capacities cannot be captured in abstract rules about how to 
interpret and predict others’ behaviours. Instead, social expertise is based in the lived experience 
of the social interactions we engage in from very early in life (Trevarthen and Aitken 2001, Reddy 
2008, 2012, Zlatev et al. 2008, Lymer 2011, Di Paolo and De Jaegher 2012). Since ToM is about 
interpreting and predicting behaviours and ignores the significance of connecting and interacting, 
it may in fact reinforce the “fragmented social perceptions” of autistic people “via the very way 
‘social skills’ are being taught” (Milton 2014, p. 798). A better approach is to begin from the 
capacities, even if limited, that an autistic person has, and to build up from there, in and through 
activities of relating, such as imitation and child-led play (Caldwell 2006, Nind and Hewitt 1994, 
Nind and Powel 2000, see also Gernsbacher 2006).  
There is a high need for better recognition of autistic people and their capacities, needs, 
desires and struggles. But as Jessica Benjamin (1988) shows, recognition is two-sided, and comes 
with high stakes in interaction. While engaging, we not only recognise an other. We are ourselves 
recognised, with all the risks this involves. Really engaging with autistic people thus provides us 
with more than a mirror in which we become aware of ourselves and our approaches. We cannot 
avoid being transformed by how we know autism. This is as true for carers, researchers, 
                                                
1 That is, while also recognizing and heeding the wishes of autistic people (and non-autistics too) to not always have to interact 
(Fletcher-Watson and Crompton 2019, see also Reddy 2008, Kyselo 2014, Galbusera et al. 2019). 
2 At the same time, making eye-contact is not such a universal “social rule” as we might think (see Zhang et al. 2006 and 
LeVine et al. 1994, quoted in Jaswal and Akhtar 2019). 
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psychiatrists, as it is for autistic people and their family, friends, therapists, teachers, colleagues. 
In all of these capacities, we engage and interact with each other. Lack of engagement can literally 
make us misunderstand each other (see e.g. Maddox et al. 2019, also Fletcher-Watson et al. 2018).  
Milton (2012) has diagnosed what he calls a double empathy problem, pointing precisely to 
difficulties in understanding that both sides have, allistics (i.e. non-autistic people) as much as 
autistics. Not seeing this, and—paradoxically?—expecting autistic people to do all the work of 
making interactions better, results in “a lack of interactional expertise between researchers and 
autistic people[,] a breakdown in trust and communication [and] an increase in tension between 
stakeholder groups” (Milton 2014, p. 800).  
I agree with this, and also with Milton’s recommendation, shared by many autistic people and 
by more and more researchers, that, in order for research on autism to “claim ethical and 
epistemological integrity,” we need to stop “fishbowling” people with autism (Milton and Moon 
2012). Instead, we need greater “involvement of autistic scholars in research and improvements 
in participatory methods” (Milton 2014, p. 794). There is a lot of development and promotion of 
participatory research (see e.g. Pellicano et al. 2017, Fletcher-Watson et al. 2019, Nicolaidis et al. 
2019), but it is also being criticised by some autistic researchers for carrying its own risks of being 
exclusionary.  
My question in this paper is: How can we best understand the lived experience of the dynamics of 
participation, so that participatory research methods most benefit autistic people, and everyone’s understanding of 
autism?  
Milton (2014) puts forward an approach to furthering the involvement of autistic researchers 
in autism research, as well as engagement between autistic and non-autistic people more generally. 
Building on sociologist Harry Collins’s concept of “interactional expertise” (Collins and Evans 
2007), Milton proposes a kind of imitation game to test whether a researcher understands autistic 
people enough to speak about or for them. To see if someone has the ability “to engage and 
interact with autistic language and communications” (Milton 2014, p. 796), they should show a 
capacity to imitate being autistic, such that independent judges could not distinguish them from 
an autistic person.  
But this kind of test is problematic. The first question, raised by Milton himself, is whether it 
is possible to have full imitative expertise of someone else in the case of (high) neurological 
difference (such as, supposedly, between an autistic and a non-autistic person). He even wonders 
whether “some level of expertise in what it is to be autistic on a phenomenological level of lived 
experience [is] always beyond the grasp of non-autistic social scientific researchers” (Milton 2014, 
p. 799). In some sense, I think it is. But neither the lived experience nor the expertise at work 
here are fixed, as we will see.  
There is a second question we must ask. To show that we understand someone, do we really 
need to imagine or pretend to be so much like them that we become practically indistinguishable 
from them? If we were to become so much like the other, to the point of becoming them, we would 
coincide with them. And this, in fact, makes us lose both the other, and ourselves.  
But not only this. In so doing, we also lose the possibility to, precisely, interact with each other. 
Interacting, engaging, requires that we remain separate. It is only as people who are different but 
interested in engaging that we can interact. And it is only in such interactions—between people 
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who are different but interested in each other—that we can get to know each other, both in life 
and scientifically (Reddy 2008).  
I know this last point, that we need difference, interest, and engagement for gaining scientific 
knowledge, is contentious. A received criterion of rigour in Western science demands that we 
gain knowledge only from an indifferent, disinterested, detached stance. However, it has been 
well established that understanding knowledge in this way is an illusion (see, e.g., Polanyi 1958, 
Prigogine and Stengers 1984, Césaire 1990, Meek 2011). But not only that. Understanding 
knowledge like this can be actively harmful. One area where this shows is precisely autism 
research. By “scientifically” interacting with autism, i.e. with an objective—really: remote—
stance, we contribute to the alienation of autistic people. We could even be accused of instituting 
alienation. This is what the neurodiversity movement acts against (Singer 1999, Davidson and Orsini 
2013, Walker 2017, Woods et al. 2018, Kapp 2020, Milton et al. 2020). Started in the autistic civil 
rights movement, neurodiversity counters the idea of one standard, “normal” way of being and 
thinking, and instead advocates for understanding the neurological diversity that characterises the 
human population as a whole. We are all different, and all deserve respect in our differences. The 
dominance of colonial Western scientific thinking is not only contested by autistic people, but by 
many others as well, not in the least by indigenous people across the world. Indigenous 
epistemologies can be said, in general—though they are varied and variously differ from each 
other—to start from an engaged worldview. They tend to aim for a harmonious interaction 
between individual people’s development and communal and cosmic harmony. One of the 
backgrounds I weave into this paper brings together arguments of critical autism studies and the 
neurodiversity movement with indigenous epistemologies. I do this because they share a striving 
against the (psychiatric) othering of colonial approaches, and for respect across difference.  
For all these reasons, what I will argue for and work to better understand in this paper is 
interested engagement.  
My aim is double: I want to contribute to better seeing the kinds of participation that are 
already there in the interactions of autistic people, and to invite more of it, in accordance with 
the needs, questions, wishes, struggles and strengths of everyone involved in each concrete 
situation. I will do this on the basis of a cognitive science paradigm that is precisely concerned 
with understanding human interaction in this humane way—one that does justice to human 
intersubjective experience. This is the enactive approach to cognition.  
Enaction is a paradigm in cognitive science that begins from the needs of living beings, their 
situated and bodily experiences, and the ways they engage with each other, to understand how 
they make sense of the world and each other. I introduce this approach in sections 2 and 3, while 
also expanding it with insights from indigenous epistemologies.3 In section 4, we will look at 
some examples from autistic languaging and interacting through the lens of this enriched enactive 
approach, and implications for transcultural psychiatry.  
What runs through all this, both in practice and in theory, are threads and difficulties of 
engagement. The current changes in our understanding of autism and in the scientific disciplines 
                                                
3 In a sense, in this paper, I make a beginning with such a connection between embodied, enactive cognitive science and 
indigenous epistemologies (see also De Jaegher 2019). Some indigenous researchers and researchers studying indigenous ways 
of knowing are, from their part, also opening up such a connection (see, e.g., Kincheloe 2011, Mejía-Arauz et al. 2018). This 
mutual reaching out to each other is a promising area for future research. 
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and fields of practice involved in this lead to novel insights, but also to new tensions in 
engagement. The growing participation of autistic people in all aspects of research and the autistic 
self-advocacy movement open up not only exciting new questions, but also heated debates. One 
example is the question of which language to use to describe people with autism. Which way of 
speaking most helps autistic people live well, be themselves, and participate in society? The best 
thing to do is to ask them, and to be open, sensitive, and transparent about the issue.4 This is a 
good paradigm for autism research and for understanding and engaging in interactions with 
autistic people.  
To be better able to cut through some of the complexities surrounding social interactions and 
autism, I think it is useful to see that what we are facing are tensions in letting each other be. Tensions, 
that is, in dealing with difference, from both sides, as Milton and others show. If, as scientists, 
therapists, teachers, medical doctors, we impose a certain understanding of autism on the people 
we are interacting with, they cannot be, in a particular sense. They cannot be themselves. This is—
and leads to—misunderstanding and harm. To change this, we need to better understand what 
respectful engagement is. Engagement, that is, in which we can all let each other be.   
I have a particular meaning in mind of letting be. I do not mean by it an invitation to disengage. 
On the contrary, letting be refers precisely to the existential engagement that is at the heart of all 
our interactions—an engagement that involves us deeply, and that is as transformative of the 
being and becoming of whom we engage with, as it is of our own being and becoming. This is a 
difficult thing both to understand and to do. This is because it generates all kinds of tensions, of 
self-maintenance and of mutual influences and determinations.  
To better understand autism and to better interact with each other, everyone will have to be 
able to stand on their own ground, to bring their own specific wishes and capacities, questions, 
troubles and hopes to the table—autistic and non-autistic participants alike. The letting be that I 
am talking about here is an existential engagement. As such, it is at once epistemological, 
ontological, and ethical, and involves all interaction partners fully.  
In what follows, I explain what this means based on Kym Maclaren’s work in epistemology, 
insights from indigenous epistemologies, and the enactive approach to social understanding as 
participatory sense-making.  
 
2 A broken horse and epistemology  
How do we know something?  
Philosopher Kym Maclaren says knowing has something to do with letting be (Maclaren 2002). 
What does this mean? Consider, she says, a horse trainer who is mainly interested in making 
money off of his horse. He trains and trains the animal, drills and exercises it. As this goes on, 
the horse becomes more and more damaged and dispirited. Eventually it breaks down.  
                                                
4 The best and first principle for deciding which language to describe people with is to ask them. Or, when the group is too 
big or there is disagreement, to use the ways of speaking that the majority prefers. At this place and time, while speaking in an 
anglophone academic literature, this seems to be identity-first language (Kenny et al. 2016). This is what I will use mostly here, 
sparsely interspersed with some person-first language (because there are also people who find that most respectful, even if 
they are not the loudest voices at the moment). Future readers and readers from different cultural and linguistic backgrounds 
may well have different preferences (see also Block et al. 2015, p. 8). For additional references on this issue, see e.g. Brown 
(2011), Sinclair (2013), Gernsbacher (2017). Melanie Yergeau’s explanation of how nouns and pronouns are relational (they 
“relate how [we] relate”), changeable, and indeed themselves a “kind of knowing” is also pertinent to this discussion (Yergeau 
2018, p. 211-13). 
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This horse has not been seen properly. It has not been recognised in its horseness, in its 
particular, concrete, individual, living being; in its needs to—also—roam and play and connect. 
The trainer has not let the horse be. He has not known his horse properly, and this has impacted 
the horse’s very being.  
The example shows something about how interwoven knowing and being are. It shows that 
the way we know something has consequences for its being, impacts its being.  
The example also shows something about the relation between knower and known. Knower 
and known are linked in their relationship. If the very being of the known can be impacted in the 
relationship of knowing, then knower and known are tethered to each other, at least for as long 
as this epistemic relationship holds. This, in turn, also impacts the knower. Because isn’t the horse 
trainer doing his particular kind of knowing badly, if he destroys his horse in his efforts to make 
money with it? And doesn’t this mean that his capacities as knower, that is: his being as this 
particular knower, as a horse trainer, is impacted by his way of knowing? Knowers act on purpose 
(McGann 2007). Their intentions, wishes, desires, fears, motivations, and so on—in part—
determine how they know. And their ways of knowing can sometimes defeat their very purposes. 
They can go against their own motivations and interests.  
Knower and known are intertwined. Knowing is an activity-in-relation that impacts both 
knower and known. Knowing modulates and transforms the being and becoming of both. This 
makes knowing and being-known tensionful activities, for all involved. This is both a deeply 
philosophical and a deeply practical issue.  
It is also an issue that may not be so easy to understand, especially for those accustomed to a 
Western, colonising worldview, which considers humans’ most sophisticated ways of knowing to 
be abstract, disconnected, and disinterested. A reader may wonder whether the example is really 
a good instance of knowing, because the horse trainer has a particular interest when interacting 
with his horse. What he is doing, one may say, is not knowing; he is, rather, using it. To call what 
he does knowing, would be to say that his knowing is tainted, biased—and this is not how we 
are used to thinking of knowing. But the point that Maclaren makes, and I agree with her and 
will take this idea forward here—a point, moreover, that has been made by other thinkers too5—
is that knowing is precisely like this. That knowing is never, in fact, disinterested. Disinterested 
knowing is not just an illusion, but even to consider “true” knowing to be abstract and 
disinterested is unethical, because it merely pretends that knowing has no impact on the known 
and the knower, and this can lead to harm.  
Where knowing in its full ethical significance is taken seriously is in engaged epistemologies. 
Developmental psychologist Vasu Reddy illustrates this well in her book How Infants Know Minds. 
Reddy shows how infants, from a much younger age than an individualistic, cognitivist 
psychology predicts, participate in creating humour, in playing, in being the object of another’s 
attention, in self-recognition (Reddy 2008). Reddy does this work as a psychologist, using 
anthropological methods like participant observation. This is of course no coincidence, because 
anthropology and sociology have always been the parts of Western science that have been most 
closely concerned and aligned with engaged epistemologies and methodologies.  
                                                
5 E.g. Merleau-Ponty 1945/2012, Heidegger 1959, Levin 1988. 
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Anthropology, however, has not had a sustained influence on the cognitive sciences, including 
psychology, even though rapprochements between them have been attempted (Boden 2006). 
Perhaps it is not so hard to understand why they have not often been comfortable bedfellows. 
There is something inherently concerned with abstraction, with disconnection, at the heart of the 
Western, colonial cognitive and medical sciences, which it is hard to break open, let alone 
dissolve. Western cognitive scientists (including neuroscientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and 
many “applied” professions linked with them, such as education, therapy, medicine, social work, 
care work, and so on), and imperialist society in general, are much maligned by cognitivist, 
individualist, functionalist assumptions. These assumptions are in fact and in effect divisive. We 
seem quite convinced that the more abstractly we think and work, the more capable we are. A 
case in point is the thought that if we could only make autistic people learn the ‘rules of social 
interaction,’ they would become socially fluent. But the idea that something like this can work 
pulls all of human capacity to the side of ‘coldly’ dealing with abstract rules. It ignores the wealth, 
depth, and intricacy of the lived, intersubjective sensitivities and powers that ground and pervade 
our abstract capacities.   
From phenomenology to feminism to decolonial theories to critical psychiatry, we know that 
we can only understand subjectivity and knowing—human intentionality—by looking at 
interactions between real, toiling, worldly bodies (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 1960, 1945/2012, Lugones 
1987, Maclaren 2002, Stawarska 2009a, McNally 2001, Davar 2014, Mills 2014, Dhar 2020, Velez 
and Tuana 2020). On this kind of understanding, abstract knowing (what colonial cognitive 
science often takes as the highest form of intelligence) is not so much the lonesome pinnacle of 
our sophistication, but in fact derives from our essentially dual (not: dualistic!) and connected 
nature (Stawarska 2009b).  
There is an approach to cognitive science that recognises and begins from this. This is the 
enactive approach. Varela, Thompson and Rosch said, in The Embodied Mind (one of the first 
“manifestos” of enaction), that  
 
“it is only by having a sense of common ground between cognitive science and 
human experience that our understanding of cognition can be more complete and reach 
a satisfying level. We thus propose a constructive task: to enlarge the horizon of cognitive 
science to include the broader panorama of human, lived experience in a disciplined, 
transformative analysis” (Varela et al. 1991, p. 14).  
 
That is: to root the view of cognition in lived experience. And moreover, to root it in 
intersubjective experience (Thompson 2001a,b, De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). This means: to 
see that most of our sense-making is both participatory and situated. How we know is deeply 
shaped in and by the socio-cultural-historical-materially situated face-to-face interactions we 
engage in (Lugones 1987, Di Paolo 2015, 2016, Maclaren 2017, 2018, Di Paolo et al. 2018).  
But an experiential-intersubjective ground for cognitive science is not something pristine or 
innocent. As soon as we understand that cognition is social, communal, and interactive, we also 
understand that it is a mess. This is something that rationalist, individualist, functionalist accounts 
do not even see, but that, as soon as we recognise the intersubjective ground of knowing, 
becomes clear and unavoidable. We like to ignore this, because messiness seems too hard to deal 
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with, especially for a “neat”, abstract science. But in cutting out the mess and making everything 
abstract, rational, detached—‘manageable’—we cut out precisely the heart of what is going on. 
We cut out the making of meaning.  
Here is where Western cognitive science can—and needs to—learn from epistemologies that 
are comfortable with the mess. Epistemologies, in other words, that have engagement at their 
roots. They can be found in many indigenous worldviews and in what de Sousa Santos calls 
‘epistemologies of the South’ (de Sousa Santos 2007, 2018, Smith 2012). Engaged epistemologies, 
generally and each in their own ways, understand how knowing is through-and-through ethical 
and ontological (Kincheloe 2011, Kimmerer 2013, Simpson 2017, Welch 2019). They know that 
we do not know anything without modulating its being and our own being. That knowing is 
consequential and has impact. It comes with responsibilities to what we know, to ourselves, to 
our worlds, views, and practices. There is a connection between these ways of knowing and 
critiques of and mobilisations against the Global Health Movement, which intends to globalize 
the Western biomedical idea of mental health (Kirmayer et al. 2003, Mills 2014, Cooper 2015). 
Cognitive science, to fully understand human knowing, needs to engage with engaged 
epistemologies to learn about the responsibility of knowing. But this cannot be a relationship of 
taking some elements, assimilating them, and forgetting others. The abstract, functionalist 
approach of traditional cognitive science is fundamentally at odds with engaged epistemologies. 
Disconnected and dichotomous thinking is at the basis of functionalism, and cognitive science is 
riddled by an abyss between mind and body, feeling and reason, subject and object of which the 
bottom is out of sight. What is needed for cognitive science to understand knowing-as-engaging 
is to first of all begin to see the common ground underlying experience, intersubjectivity, and 
sense-making. Cognitive science itself needs to begin recognising this, before it can start to 
engage with engaged epistemologies. This is because, as Sarah Lucia Hoagland says: “it is not 
because we are able to be scholars that we are positioned to develop knowledge of marginalized 
others; it is because of how we are positioned in relation to marginalized others that we are able 
to be scholars” (2020, p. 48).  
The enactive approach, with its basis in both existential phenomenology (e.g. Merleau-Ponty 
1945/2012) and dynamical systems theory (Thelen and Smith 1994, Juarrero 1999), can recognise 
the existence and influence of an abstract separation between mind and body, reason and 
emotion, and so on, while also seeing both elements arise from the same soil. Because, as a 
science, it roots itself in the material-energetic processes of life, in lived experience, and in 
intersubjectivity, it is grounded. It is not abstract, but toils; it continually works at understanding, 
also at a meta-level, by critically reflecting on its own continual theoretical and empirical 
development (see Di Paolo et al. 2018). This, I think, is the ground from which enactive cognitive 
science can begin to engage with engaged epistemologies, and to build an understanding of 
difference in general—including neurodiversity—that does justice to everyone’s experience, 
while also understanding what cognition is at a general level. The point here is that “[t]he 
problems facing us are solved, ‘not by giving new information’…, but by us ‘going on’ with each 
other in a new way” (Katz and Shotter 1996).  
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3 Engaging epistemology  
The enactive approach to cognition defines cognisers as sense-makers. Sense-makers act and 
interact out of their various cares and concerns. Things matter to sense-makers. Sense-making 
(cognition, knowing, understanding) happens in relation to the various identities that people 
maintain, e.g. as a client, a teacher, technician, baker, student, sister, scientist, and so on. 
Maintaining these identities gives them perspectives from which they view and interact with the 
world and with each other. They act on the basis of needs that stem directly from these concerns, 
which form the ever-changing bases of their different identities. All of this, they do as metabolic, 
sensorimotor, and intersubjective, societally situated, labouring and working bodies (Di Paolo et 
al. 2018). We have metabolic needs (hunger, thirst), sensorimotor habits that we maintain or try 
to break (smoking, dieting), and intersubjective concerns (“will they like me?”) and agencies. As 
particular, concrete and situated bodies, sense-makers have needs and constraints on all these 
levels that intricately relate to each other.  
Underlying living sense-making is a basic tension between self-production and self-distinction 
(Varela 1979, Maturana and Varela 1980). Living beings continually construct themselves out of 
the environment, and in doing so, also continually distinguish themselves from the environment. 
Sense-makers deal with the tension between these opposing tendencies by regulating their 
couplings with their environment in view of their metabolic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective 
needs and constraints and what the environment has to offer—what we call agency. In this way, 
enactive sense-makers are continually individuating themselves and ongoingly becoming in 
interaction (Di Paolo 2018, 2020, Di Paolo et al. 2018).  
Sense-makers engage in social interactions, which are emergent processes between people 
that generate their own dynamics. These processes can pull people in, or push them out. Social 
interaction processes can self-organise and take on a certain autonomy (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
2007, De Jaegher et al. 2010). The processes that make up social interactions, e.g. the rhythmic 
dynamics between interactors’ breathing and heart-beats, or how their vocabularies align over 
time, can coordinate in such a way that these processes themselves work to maintain the 
interaction. As such, interaction processes can—in part—determine how people participate in 
them. We not only influence each other in our interactions (our intentions, motivations, 
perspectives are impacted by each other’s presence, moves, and utterances), but these interactions 
themselves, as emergent, coordinating processes, also determine what happens in an encounter. 
Think of greeting someone you have not seen in a while. Imagine you are used to meeting in a 
formal context (say, as doctor and patient), but this evening, you bump into each other at a house 
party. You’re feeling jovial and light-hearted. How will you greet each other now? Will you shake 
hands? Hug? How the greeting in this different situation turns out not only depends on each of 
your intentions and the context, but is also coordinated there-and-then. Whether it will end up 
being a hug or a handshake (or a clumsy ‘neither’) emerges, in part, out of the interaction itself. 
Each of you participate in it, each of you bring expectations. There is a certain pre-coordination, 
but the greeting that emerges tonight is co-determined by the interactive normativity (by the 
coordination dynamics that emerge between you in context), and what each of you brings.  
Enaction searches for the principles of sense-making by asking What is at stake for a sense-
maker?, thereby doing justice to their specific bodily needs, self-organisation, constraints, context, 
and capabilities. Asking what is at stake for someone helps to see what identities they are 
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maintaining, what their concerns are in the situation, and thereby why they behave in certain 
ways.  
The enactive approach also theorises language, elaborating on Bakhtin’s idea that language is 
a living stream in which we participate (Bakhtin 1981, 1986, Cuffari et al. 2015, Di Paolo et al. 
2018). It is a living stream of utterances, all around us, that we take up, agree with or contest, 
struggle with, do and do not understand, carry forward, copy, repeat, address to others and are 
addressed by, modulate, transform. This stream of utterances moves through us and changes us. 
We variously pick it up and play with it. As we participate in language (which, as linguistic 
bodies—as humans—we continually do), both we and language change. Our organisation as 
living, sensorimotor, and intersubjective bodies is modified by language as we participate in it. 
Language can affect us, down to the metabolic level. Think of how a harsh word from a loved 
one can make it hard to digest dinner (cf. research showing that quality of marital relationship 
impacts wound-healing, Kiecolt-Glaser et al. 2005).  
We incorporate other persons’ and socio-cultural ways of speaking, of thinking, of judging. 
We can even incarnate others’ agencies. This means that others can ‘speak through us’. When 
this happens, we don’t know whether it is us speaking, or the other person. You may have your 
grandmother’s “clean your plate!” in your ears after dinner. You have incarnated your 
grandmother. She is a small part of how you organise your life, the actions you take. Is it you or 
her speaking? In this case, you may be fine with this particular incarnation, but other such ‘voices’ 
you may not want to accept, you fight with. This is the tension of self-production and self-
distinction that linguistic bodies deal with: maintaining your ways of speaking, thinking, 
interpreting, acting, meaning, presenting and being yourself, while always participating in 
(including rejecting, questioning, critiquing, etc.) the living stream of language that you move in, 
incorporating and incarnating others’ agencies.  
This enactive way of approaching (human) sense-making is, then, an engaged or even an 
engaging epistemology (De Jaegher 2019). What does this mean? Maclaren (2002), remember, 
said that knowing is letting be. It is a balancing between the ongoing becomings of both known 
and knower. The knower has to let the known be, in order to know it. Letting be is an activity, 
but an activity of at the same time approaching (determining) the known, and letting it be—itself. 
Too much interference with the known, and it will be over-determined—in danger of losing 
itself—so that we do not truly know it, or misunderstand it at best. Too little interference, to the 
point of disengaging from it, will mean we also do not know it, because we are not in touch with 
it anymore (we under-determine it). Knowing as letting be is a careful epistemological balancing 
act that happens only in a relation.  
This idea of knowing as letting be is unusual, and perhaps a little difficult to understand. But 
there is an area in our lives where we know these tensions of letting be well. We know the—
sometimes difficult—balancing act of letting be in our loving relationships. I’m thinking here in 
particular of the most basic tension in loving relationships: that between being in relation and 
being yourself. How much do you give in, how much do you assert yourself, and still remain well-
connected? We know this kind of tension from parent-child relations, friendships, romantic and 
sexual relationships (see e.g. Gilligan 1982, 2003). What furthermore characterises every loving 
relationship at its most basic level, is that it is existential. Loving goes out from the core of your 
being—it involves you existentially—and goes out to a particular other, whom your loving 
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reaches out to, because of their being. It is thus a radically existential relationship. Loving is a non-
neutral, particular, concrete involvement, with particular, concrete others, in particular, concrete 
interactions. In this kind of relationship, not only you, but the other, as well as the interactions 
between you, impact all of it. This relationship, then, has three elements: the ones who love (that’s 
two), and their relationship itself. Each of these plays a fundamental part in loving. Leave one 
out, and there is no loving. (The elements are necessary and sufficient.) This is an extension and 
deepening of the primordial idea of participatory sense-making. Here also, the individual 
participants co-determine and are co-determined by their interactions (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
2007, De Jaegher et al. 2010). In loving, this interaction involves you basically and existentially. 
Loving is an existential dialectic that swirls up both its individuals and its relational/interactional 
elements into an ongoing storm.  
The problems of the colonial tendency to think epistemology dichotomously stem from 
forgetting this root and core of what knowing is. Knowing is like loving in the sense that both 
are manifestations of the same existential way of relating (De Jaegher 2019). Loving and knowing 
are both fundamental ways of relating in which the lover (the knower) is existentially involved 
with a particular other, and in which their relation, as well as each of them as participants, play 
basic primary roles, and can all influence and impact on each other. Already on the enactive idea 
that living beings are metabolically involved in their sense-making, what knowing is is deeply 
determined by what is existentially necessary for the organism. As living beings, we are tied to 
our life provisioning—our processes of living are completely intertwined with our environments.  
An engaged epistemology, one that understands the depths and widths of human knowing 
by engaging with people, can thus be understood as a loving and knowing epistemology, or an 
engaging epistemology.  
Defining loving as I do (in this conceptual-experiential exercise)6, begins from the most basic, 
minimal form of both loving and knowing. The form of knowing that is analogous to loving, that 
is, the most basic form of knowing, is this form of relating. Maclaren (2002) makes the same point. 
She also says that the fact that the horse trainer could get it so wrong with his horse, destroying 
it in the process (and also damaging himself as a trainer), shows that letting be is something we 
have to learn. Moreover, she argues, we learn it from letting others be. Letting be, she says, is first 
of all intersubjective, in-relation-with-others. I agree with this. Her example shows that knower 
and known are existentially engaged. Both of their being is implicated in this relation between 
them. More even: Maclaren also says (2018) that we are ontologically intimate with each other, 
which means that in knowing each other and interacting with each other, we cannot help but 
transgress each other. This is perhaps the strongest explication of why epistemology is ethical.  
What can this enactive, engaging epistemology do to help better see how autistic people 
participate, to let autistic people be (themselves), and to improve interactions between autistic 
and non-autistic people?  
                                                
6 Note that the definition of loving I use here is fundamental and minimal. It is in this form that knowing is similar to (if not 
just the same as) loving. I am not talking about more complex forms of loving, like unrequieted love. The exercise I’m doing 
here is experiential-conceptual: I point to a similiarty in ways of relating, in order to elucidate knowing. A further comparison 
of the differences and similarities between loving and knowing in more intricate (I would say, derived) forms and relations, 
which in a sense come after this shared core, is needed, and may itself be able to further elucidate the troubles of both loving 
and knowing, but this is work for future research (see also De Jaegher 2019). 
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4 Implications for transcultural psychiatry: heeding what participation teaches us  
What guidelines for both seeing and improving participation can we derive from the enactive 
approach sketched in the previous sections? The first recommendation is to start from where 
and how people are, and to let them be where and how they are. To begin any engagement from 
there. Some autism research already takes this as a starting point. It begins to shed light on some 
of the sophistication with which autistic people participate in social interactions.  
Adopting the attitude of letting be does not close the door to scientific research, or to therapy. 
On the contrary, this attitude can inform and help generate scientific hypotheses and improve 
practices. In our book Linguistic Bodies, we put forward two enactive hypotheses about autistic 
linguistic participation. First, we propose that autistic people tend to over- and under-regulate 
interaction dynamics. And second, we propose they braid utterances differently. This means that 
autistic people tend to engage with different threads of meaning than non-autistics do (Di Paolo 
et al. 2018, chapter 10). This may make it hard for them to pick up on certain meanings. Autism 
is diverse, it manifests in diverse ways, and autistic people interact in many ways. The maxim we 
worked out in Linguistic Bodies is that, in the face of all this diversity, one thing to do is to enhance 
participation, if and when desired. Also if this means to take breaks, to retreat, to remain 
sometimes unseen, to not know, and to attend to “a rhetoric that tics, a rhetoric that shrieks and 
wails and sometimes bites” (Yergeau 2015, p. 93). A participation between non-autistic and 
autistic people that lets each one be and become.  
Several studies show that this works well, in both autistic children and adults. For instance, 
discourse analysis shows that, with sensitive interaction partners, autistic children can play with 
pedagogical instructions, with withdrawal and engagement, with language, with self-presentation 
and -interpretation, and with forming their identity (Ochs et al. 2004; Bottema-Beutel and Smith 
2013, Sterponi and Fasulo 2010, Sterponi and Shankey 2014, Bottema-Beutel 2017). They can 
also collaborate and have awareness of others when given technology designed to support their 
ways of interacting (Holt and Yuill 2014; 2017). Ethnographic research shows how autistic 
children become both more stable and more flexible in their bodily participation when therapists 
use sensory integration techniques and take them on narrative journeys (Park 2008, 2010, 2012, 
see also Lee et al. 2016). In these investigations, the autistic children, their interaction partners, 
and the researchers are able to let the child be, while also staying with their own motivations, 
aims, and perspectives in the interaction. In this way, they can balance the tensions in 
participation over time, including moving through breakdowns.  
Participatory design researchers explicitly involve autistic people as co-investigators to 
develop technologies to enhance their quality of life. Together, they engage in iterative co-design 
processes to explore and reflect on what would be most helpful. Approaches like this stimulate 
rethinking ideas of empowerment, outcomes, and assistive technology (e.g. van Dijk et al. 2019, 
Frauenberger et al. 2019, see also Parsons et al. 2017, Fletcher-Watson et al. 2018, Parsons et al. 
2020). Such approaches unearth the micro-ethics of this kind of practice, and naturally go 
together with critical reflections on empathy, which—if understood as inferring another’s 
intentions—risks being one-directional and thereby over-determining people’s needs (Spiel et al. 
2017, 2019, 2020).   
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Most autistic people desire friendship, intimacy, and social relations. They may not always 
know so well how to have them, or may simply have them in different ways than non-autistics 
do (Daniel and Billingsley 2010, Calder et al. 2013, Vine Foggo and Webster 2017, Sedgewick 
and Pellicano 2019, Sedgewick et al. 2019, Cresswell et al. 2019). Many experience loneliness, but 
“talking together” about it can be a “potent remedy”, as Williams shows in a sensitive study that 
integrates community building and critical reflections on participation research (Williams 2020). 
Crompton and colleagues (2020) show that having and maintaining friendships is easier with 
other autistic people than with non-autistics, for all the reasons one may expect: with other 
autistics, people feel like they belong, that they can be themselves and are understood. In 
interactions with non-autistics, in contrast, autistics more often feel misunderstood, feel the 
stresses of being a minority, and cannot so easily be themselves.  
These are all examples and considerations of seeing and inviting autistic participation. To do so 
means to do justice to participatory sense-making’s three elements: each participant’s sense-
making, needs and constraints—what matters to them—and the emergent dynamics of the 
interactions between them. Research shows that autistic interactions have particular 
characteristics and dynamics (De Jaegher 2013, Bolis et al. 2017, Heasman and Gillespie 2019, 
Crompton, Ropar, et al. 2020). Understanding these better can help combat misperceptions that 
come from taking a merely neurotypical perspective, and can improve interactions between 
autistic and non-autistic people (see also Sinclair 2010).  
To conclude, I’d like to come back to where we began this paper. Milton hopes that “those 
wanting to research the sociality of autistic people may take up the challenge of an imitation 
game” (Milton 2014, p. 801). I would not. What I would rather do is to continue interacting with 
autistic people in ways that are both serious and playful, open and vulnerable, each of us starting 
from our own points of view and expertise, open to who we are encountering, and to changing 
and transforming in and through these interactions (and researching and building methodologies 
on this basis, e.g. De Jaegher et al. 2017). I wholeheartedly agree with Milton and others that the 
field of autism research needs full “ethical and epistemological integrity” (ibid., p. 796), and that 
this requires that autistic people participate at all levels of research. But much more is to be gained 
from engagement than from either fishbowling or imitation games. The road to a solution lies in 
sensitively moving into and out of what emerges between us. The enactive approach in cognitive 
science supports and grounds doing this.  
This, then, I think, is one way to respond to the questions Melanie Yergeau asks: “What to 
do with scholarship that denies autistic agency, denies autistic voice, denies autistic personhood?” 
and “how can we create more inclusive spaces to speak back to these theories of lack?” (Yergeau 
2015, p. 89–90). I would say: by understanding how everyone can participate in interactions, and 
understanding what concretely matters to people in each situation. It is up to all of us to be 
inclusive. We can do this by continually developing the scientific understanding of participatory 
sense-making, and by learning to trust its processes in practice.  
Reading decolonial, indigenous, and autistic thinkers and educators, what I hear—even if it 
is often not said so explicitly—is a plea for Western scientists to be silent for a change. To 
participate in silence. This may help us listen. In Audre Lorde’s words, it may help us recognise 
that  
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“[w]ithin the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies that security 
which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of our 
future, along with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that future 
into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power 
is forged” (Lorde 2017, p. 91). 
 
An engaged epistemology does not mean that we will—or have to—know each other 
exhaustively. It does mean that knowing each other will never be finished, because each of us 
keep on developing, both apart and in relation to each other. That is why this is not just an 
engaged, but an engaging epistemology. It engages us.  
It is true, especially regarding questions like the one addressed in this paper, that 
epistemological integrity needs ethical integrity. It also needs an appropriate ontology, and this 
ontology is one of ongoing becoming-in-relation. This is bound to involve deep tensions, which 
we can move through and survive, or not. Understanding that loving and knowing will always 
involve such tensions should help with moving through them and, in the process, being able to 
truly recognise each other, even if fleetingly (because the possibility is always there to be 
recognised wrongly, but also to be recognised better, recognised again). 
What bringing together insights from indigenous epistemologies, enactive cognitive science, 
and the neurodiversity movement does, is to deepen the insight at the heart of participatory 
sense-making, which is that engaging with each other means to stand on one’s own ground and, 
from there, to engage in social interactions, which will entail breakdowns, repairs, and 
transformations, of oneself and of the relationship. This is engaging knowing.   
As for the field of transcultural psychiatry, both the clinical and the research practice can learn 
from explicitly recognising these tensions inherent in engagement. When Melissa Park says, “the 
work to cultivate experiences that matter to individuals remains an ‘underground practice’ … that 
continues to create ongoing dilemmas deeply felt in clinical practice” (Park 2012, S34), I wonder 
what would happen if we brought these tensions to the surface? As Park (2008, 2010, 2012) and 
other researchers show, we may be able to deal with them better than we thought. That is what 
engagement-sensitive methods can bring to clinical work and to the sciences of the mind: a lived 
understanding of our human (in)abilities to participate, and that we can trust them (however 
paradoxical this may seem at times).  
 
 
–––––––––––––– 
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